Should a History of Spousal Abuse Serve as a Presumptive Bar to Inheritance? by Taite, Phyllis C
Florida A&M University College of Law
Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law
Journal Publications Faculty Works
2013
Should a History of Spousal Abuse Serve as a
Presumptive Bar to Inheritance?
Phyllis C. Taite
Florida A&M University College of Law, phyllis.taite@famu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.law.famu.edu/faculty-research
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, and the Family Law Commons
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Works at Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law. For more information, please
contact linda.barrette@famu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Phyllis C. Taite, Should a History of Spousal Abuse Serve As A Presumptive Bar To Inheritance?, JOTWELL ( June 11, 2013)
(reviewing Spivack, Carla, Let’s Get Serious: Spousal Abuse Should Bar Inheritance, 90 Or. L. Rev. 247 (2011)),
http://trustest.jotwell.com/should-a-history-of-spousal-abuse-serve-asa- presumptive-bar-to-inheritance/.
Should a History of Spousal Abuse Serve As A 
Presumptive Bar To Inheritance?
http://trustest.jotwell.com/should-a-history-of-spousal-abuse-serve-as-a-presumptive-bar-to-inheritance/
Spivack, Carla, Let’s Get Serious: Spousal Abuse Should Bar Inheritance, 90 Or. L. Rev.  247 (2011).
Phyllis C. Taite
When I read the title there were three questions that came to mind right away. First, I was curious how to 
determine the type of abuse that would serve as a presumptive bar.  Next, I was curious how this presumptive 
bar would apply to wills and/or other forms of inheritance.  Finally, I wondered what mechanism would be in 
place to prevent this proposal from being used to usurp a woman’s decision to transfer her own property the way 
she desires.
Professor Spivak answers the first question by proposing a presumptive bar to inheritance to an abusive spouse 
because it provides an opportunity to expand existing laws.  The existing laws already provide a presumptive 
bar to inheritance to perpetrators of elder and child abuse of the decedent.  Including spousal abuse as a barrier 
to inheritance sends the message that spousal abuse is just as an important public policy stance to deny an unjust 
enrichment to abusers as the others categories of abuse.  As a policy matter I agree that perpetrators of spousal 
abuse should not be permitted to inherit in cases where systemic abuse exists.  As a practical matter I envisioned 
this would be tougher to regulate because there are different types of abuse and how should abuse be defined for 
this limited purpose.
Professor Spivack answers with proposals for a specific set of behavior to regulate by limiting the proposed rule 
to circumstances evidencing “coercive control.”  She defined coercive control as “a pattern of repeated battery 
and injury, psychological abuse, sexual assault, progressive social isolation, deprivation, and intimidation by an 
intimate partner.”  Her proposal focuses on certain behaviors such as the strategic use of threats and force to 
“deter or trigger specific behavior, to win arguments or assert dominance” and controlling the victim through 
fear and intimidation.  By barring spouse abusers from inheritance in these circumstances the bridge between 
intimate violence and women’s wealth inequality can be forged.
The article also addressed my question of how the proposed rule would apply to wills or other forms of 
inheritance.  Professor Spivack proposed the best doctrine applicable to the circumstances is duress.  Initially I 
wasn’t convinced it was the best approach since undue influence seemed tailor made for such a doctrine.  
Professor Spivack convinced me she was correct by demonstrating a key distinction between undue influence 
and duress as applied to her proposal.  First, undue influence may easily be demonstrated because of the 
confidential relationship that exists between spouses.  Based on the confidential relationship, the presumption of 
undue influence would apply if the spouse receives the bulk of the estate and the will occurred under suspicious 
circumstances.  The problem, as she describes it, is that presumption may apply in too many cases which would 
render the rule too burdensome.  The proposed rule is only intended to capture those cases of coercive control. 
With the additional element of coercive control, duress is more appropriate because the acts of violence or 
threats of violence, is already incorporated in the doctrine.
A couple of important points to make about the article are that proposal is not designed to deter spousal abuse 
and coercive control may be proven without a demonstration of actual coercion. I appreciated the fact that 
Professor Spivack recognized that perpetrators of spouse abuse are not likely to be deterred from abusing 
because they may lost he right to inherit from the victim spouse.  In addition, she points out that coercion may 
be demonstrated by proving the abuse and making the connection that abuse has the effect of brainwashing the 
victim which, in turn, weakens the ability of the victim to exercise independent judgment.  Keeping in mind the 
goal is to prevent the unjust enrichment of the abusive spouse, the justification for the proposed rule is still 
sound.
My final concern regarding this topic was whether the subject women would be totally prevented from 
disposing of their property in the manner they selected.  She addresses the concern by stating her proposal is an 
attempt to respond to dynamics of the coercive relationship. She points out that political and social inequalities 
are a reality and the terms of this proposal does not change that.
Next she indicates that while women may resist their abusers, they are often more concerned with physical 
safety and may not have property transfers high on the list of priorities.  In addition, she points out the victim, 
under the context of duress, is often in a position of making decisions based on options constrained by the will 
of the abuser.  This could manifest in a will that devises all property to the abuser or a decision not to make a 
will or other non probate transfers.   Finally, she points out that at the time the proposal would be applicable the 
victim is dead; therefore, not in a position to make any further decisions.  As a result, the analysis is limited to 
determining how much weight to give to decisions she has already made. Based on the coercive nature of the 
relationship, the policy behind the proposal, to deny the unjust enrichment to the abusive surviving spouse, is 
sound because her actions or inactions may not be based on her own free will.
In addition to the above, she provides specific information indicating the type of evidence she that should be 
used to establish evidence of the coercive control. By providing specific definitions, it further provides 
guidelines to limit application of the proposed rule to certain types of systematic abuse, and not all cases where 
abuse might exist.
This article was very insightful and provided the policy justifications as well as the method to implement the 
changes.  This article provides the framework to adopt the provision within applicable UPC and/or state law and 
I recommend this article to legislators, UPC drafters, and professors teaching trusts and estates.
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